A Markman hearing is a federal pretrial proceeding at which the district judge construes the disputed terms of a patent’s claims as a matter of law. The name comes from Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (unanimous; claim construction is a question of law allocated to the judge), in which the Supreme Court held that claim construction is “exclusively within the province of the court.” Id. at 388–89. The judge’s constructions govern summary judgment and bind the jury’s infringement analysis at trial. Appellate review runs under Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015): de novo on the ultimate legal construction, clear-error on subsidiary fact-findings.
Keyhani LLC represents plaintiffs and defendants in patent infringement litigation and broader federal district court IP litigation in the District of New Jersey, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and federal courts nationwide. The sections below explain what a Markman hearing is, how the governing Phillips methodology constrains claim construction, how Teva changed appellate review, and how the local patent rules in D.N.J., SDNY, and EDNY structure the process from disclosure through hearing.
This article is general information about U.S. patent claim-construction practice, not legal advice. Readers facing a specific Markman issue should consult counsel about the particulars of their case.
Key Takeaways
- A Markman hearing is the pretrial proceeding where a federal district judge construes disputed patent claim terms as a matter of law under Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996); the jury does not decide claim construction but applies the court’s constructions to the facts.
- The controlling methodology comes from Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc), which establishes the intrinsic-record hierarchy controlling claim construction (see the dedicated section below).
- Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015), modified — but did not overrule — Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc); the bifurcated appellate-review standard is summarized in the Markman framework table below.
- Indefiniteness under Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014), is commonly briefed alongside claim construction: where the intrinsic record leaves a term fatally ambiguous, a claim may be invalidated under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) rather than given a strained construction.
- In the District of New Jersey, claim construction is structured by L. Pat. R. 4.1 through 4.6: opening Markman briefs are filed contemporaneously by both sides 45 days after the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement under L. Pat. R. 4.5(a), and responding submissions are due 60 days after the opening submissions under L. Pat. R. 4.5(c) (subject to the assigned judge’s individual rules).
- A Markman ruling typically drives summary judgment on infringement or invalidity, which is why claim construction is better treated as a strategic exercise than a purely procedural one.
Why Judges, Not Juries, Decide Patent Claim Meaning
Before 1996, courts divided on whether claim construction was a factual question for juries or a legal question for judges. The Supreme Court resolved the debate in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). Justice Souter’s unanimous opinion proceeded in two complementary steps. First, the Seventh Amendment historical analysis: the Court found no established 18th-century jury practice for construing patent terms; the historical analogues did not control. Markman, 517 U.S. at 377–84. Second, functional considerations — judicial competence to parse technical documents and the uniform-interpretation interest in advancing the public-notice function of the patent system — confirmed the allocation rather than standing apart from the Seventh Amendment conclusion. Id. at 388–90. The Court held that “the construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the province of the court.” Id. at 388–89.
That allocation of authority produced the hearing that now bears the case’s name. When the parties identify disputed claim terms, the district judge construes those terms before trial so that infringement and validity can be litigated against a fixed meaning of the claim language.
When Does the Markman Hearing Happen in a Patent Case?
There is no single federal deadline for the Markman hearing. Timing is set by the district judge’s scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 and by any local patent rules the district has adopted, which typically control where they exist. In many patent cases, the hearing occurs after claim-construction discovery and before later phases of expert discovery, although timing varies significantly by district and judge. Summary judgment motions frequently follow the claim-construction ruling, because the meaning the judge adopts often determines whether the accused product reads on the claim or whether a prior-art reference anticipates it.
The typical Markman workflow in federal patent cases proceeds through three defined stages.
1. Identify Disputed Terms
The parties exchange proposed constructions and identify the claim terms they genuinely dispute. Many districts require a joint claim-construction and prehearing statement before briefing opens.
2. Claim-Construction Briefing
Opening, responsive, and reply briefs are filed on a schedule set by local patent rules or the judge’s individual rules. Briefs cite intrinsic and, where appropriate, extrinsic evidence.
3. Markman Hearing and Order
The judge holds the hearing — often with a technology tutorial — and issues a written claim-construction order adopting a construction for each disputed term.
How Does a Judge Construe a Disputed Claim Term?
The controlling methodology for claim construction comes from the Federal Circuit’s en banc decision in Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc; abrogating the dictionary-first approach of Texas Digital Systems). The court construes terms as a person of ordinary skill in the art (“POSITA”) would have understood them at the time of the invention — the POSITA is the lens through which the intrinsic record is read. Phillips established a hierarchy: the judge first looks to intrinsic evidence — the claim language itself, read in the context of the specification and the prosecution history — and only turns to extrinsic evidence, such as expert testimony and dictionaries, as a secondary source. Id. at 1314–19. Claim differentiation — the presumption that an independent claim is not limited to a feature that appears only in a dependent claim — often shapes construction when an independent claim is read against the added limitations of its dependents. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314–15.
Within that hierarchy, the specification carries particular force. The en banc Phillips court reiterated that the specification is “the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.” Id. at 1315 (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The prosecution history — the applicant’s and patent owner’s exchanges with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) — lacks the specification’s clarity for ordinary claim-construction purposes, but it may be dispositive under the prosecution-disclaimer doctrine (also called disavowal) where the applicant or patent owner clearly and unmistakably disclaimed claim scope. The Federal Circuit extended that doctrine to statements made during inter partes review (IPR) in Aylus Networks, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 856 F.3d 1353, 1359–61 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (holding that a patent owner’s statements in an IPR preliminary response and post-institution response can support prosecution disclaimer in district-court litigation).
Phillips did not emerge from nowhere. The specification-primacy approach originated nine years earlier in Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Vitronics stated that “in most situations, an analysis of the intrinsic evidence alone will resolve any ambiguity in a disputed claim term” and that “[i]n such circumstances, it is improper to rely on extrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1583. Phillips confirmed the Vitronics approach en banc but softened the absolute exclusion of extrinsic evidence, recognizing that expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises may be consulted as a secondary source so long as the intrinsic record retains primacy. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317–19.
The Phillips Hierarchy at a Glance
- Claim language. The words of the claim, read in the context of the surrounding claims and the claim set as a whole.
- Specification. The Vitronics-origin “single best guide to the meaning of a disputed term” reiterated by the en banc Phillips court — the written description that teaches what the invention is.
- Prosecution history. The applicant’s and patent owner’s statements to the USPTO during original examination and other PTO proceedings — with Aylus extending the doctrine specifically to IPR statements. A clear and unmistakable disclaimer (prosecution-history disclaimer / disavowal) may be dispositive of scope under the prosecution-disclaimer doctrine.
- Extrinsic evidence. Expert testimony, dictionaries, and treatises — secondary, not determinative.
When Must a Judge Resolve a Claim-Term Dispute?
A district court has an affirmative duty to resolve genuine disputes over claim scope. In O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Federal Circuit held that “when the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding the scope of a claim term, it is the court’s duty to resolve it.” Id. at 1362. A judge cannot punt a disputed term to the jury under a bare “plain and ordinary meaning” label when the parties have identified a real disagreement about what that meaning is.
O2 Micro does not require construction of every term a party lists. Courts routinely deny construction requests for terms the parties do not genuinely dispute on scope — or for terms where “plain and ordinary meaning” is itself the resolution of the dispute. The distinction matters at Markman briefing: a term is worth construing when the parties’ proposals diverge on claim scope in a way that affects infringement or validity, not merely because counsel would prefer a particular form of words.
Means-Plus-Function Claims: A Recurring Markman Flashpoint
Claims that invoke means-plus-function language under 35 U.S.C. § 112(f) are construed to cover the corresponding structure disclosed in the specification and equivalents thereof. Identifying that corresponding structure — or arguing that no structure is disclosed — is a recurring Markman flashpoint in software and electronics cases, and it is a common trigger for indefiniteness challenges under § 112(b). The controlling modern authority on the § 112(f) trigger is Williamson v. Citrix Online, LLC, 792 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in relevant part), which overruled the prior “strong” presumption against treating non-“means” terms as means-plus-function and held that the presumption is rebuttable where the claim term “fails to recite sufficiently definite structure or else recites function without reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.” Id. at 1349.
Indefiniteness at the Claim-Construction Stage
Indefiniteness arguments under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) are commonly raised alongside claim construction. Indefiniteness is a validity defense under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(3)(A), which more broadly preserves § 112 invalidity defenses (other than best-mode non-disclosure, which the AIA carved out). The Supreme Court set the current standard in Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.S. 898 (2014): a claim is indefinite if, read in light of the specification and the prosecution history, it “fail[s] to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention.” Id. at 901.
In litigation, two recurring interactions between claim construction and indefiniteness are commonly observed. First, because the intrinsic record is the primary source under Phillips, the same evidence used to construe a term often answers the definiteness question — judges can and do resolve both in the same order. Second, where a term cannot be construed because the intrinsic record leaves it fatally ambiguous, the claim may be invalidated for indefiniteness rather than given a strained construction. A defendant who briefs indefiniteness as an alternative to a narrow construction often secures either outcome as a win.
Appellate Review After Teva v. Sandoz
From 1998 to 2015, the Federal Circuit reviewed claim construction de novo across the board under Cybor Corp. v. FAS Technologies, Inc., 138 F.3d 1448 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc), which held that claim construction is “a purely legal question, subject to de novo review on appeal.” Id. at 1454. That pure-de-novo rule produced a famously high reversal rate and drove strategic appeals.
The Supreme Court modified Cybor — not overruled it — in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318 (2015). Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer held that while the Federal Circuit still reviews the ultimate claim construction de novo, it must review the district court’s subsidiary factual findings based on extrinsic evidence for clear error under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6). “[T]o overturn the judge’s resolution of an underlying factual dispute,” the Court explained, “the Court of Appeals must find that the judge, in respect to those factual findings, has made a clear error.” Id. at 327. Construction based solely on the intrinsic record — the claim language, specification, and prosecution history — remains reviewed de novo. Id. at 331–32; see also Shire Dev., LLC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 787 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (post-Teva Federal Circuit gloss confirming that where the district court relied solely on intrinsic evidence, claim construction is reviewed de novo).
The practical effect of Teva is that how a district judge resolves expert-testimony disputes — for example, disagreements among experts about what the POSITA would have understood a technical term to mean — is reviewed with deference. The ultimate legal conclusion on claim meaning remains a question the Federal Circuit decides afresh. A Markman strategy that relies heavily on extrinsic expert testimony now has more protection on appeal than it did pre-Teva; a strategy built on intrinsic evidence alone enjoys no more appellate deference than it did before.
Markman framework: allocation between judge and jury, plus appellate-review standards.
| Issue | Allocation / Standard | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Allocation of claim construction (trial court) | Judge, as a matter of law | Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–89 |
| Appellate review — ultimate construction of a disputed term | De novo | Teva, 574 U.S. at 331 |
| Appellate review — subsidiary fact-findings based on extrinsic evidence (expert testimony) | Clear error | Teva, 574 U.S. at 327; Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(6) |
| Appellate review — construction based solely on intrinsic evidence (claim, specification, prosecution history) | De novo | Teva, 574 U.S. at 331–32 (modifying Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1454); Shire, 787 F.3d at 1368 |
A note on forum: Teva’s clear-error standard for subsidiary fact-findings is the standard for district-court claim-construction appeals to the Federal Circuit under FRCP 52(a)(6). It does not apply to Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) appeals, which run through the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)’s substantial-evidence standard under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E). A Markman hearing is, by definition, a district-court proceeding — so Teva’s clear-error rule is the operative appellate-review framework for Markman rulings.
Markman Practice in the District of New Jersey
For patent cases filed in the District of New Jersey, the claim-construction sequence is structured by the D.N.J. Local Patent Rules. Under D.N.J. Local Patent Rule 4.1, the parties begin by exchanging proposed terms for construction on a schedule tied to infringement and invalidity contentions. Rule 4.2 then calls for an exchange of preliminary proposed constructions, and Rule 4.3 requires the parties to meet and confer and submit a Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement.
Claim-construction discovery must be completed within 30 days of the joint statement under Rule 4.4. The briefing sequence then follows in Rule 4.5:
- L. Pat. R. 4.5(a) — opening briefs. Both sides file their opening Markman briefs contemporaneously (not in a plaintiff-opens / defendant-responds sequence), 45 days after the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement.
- L. Pat. R. 4.5(b) — opening-declarant expert discovery. Expert discovery from opening-submission declarants closes within 30 days after the opening submissions.
- L. Pat. R. 4.5(c) — responding submissions. Responding Markman submissions are due 60 days after the opening submissions, subject to the assigned judge’s individual rules.
Rule 4.6 then calls for counsel to confer and propose a hearing schedule within two weeks of the responding submissions. The result is a structured scheduling framework governed by Rule 16 and implemented through local patent rules, within which courts may allow expert declarations and technology tutorials depending on the complexity of the case and the practices of the assigned judge. Term-number caps (for example, limiting the parties to ten disputed terms for briefing) are typically imposed by the individual judge’s standing order rather than the Local Patent Rules themselves — practitioners should check the assigned judge’s rules early.
For New Jersey corporate defendants and out-of-state patent owners litigating in D.N.J., the practical consequence is that claim-construction strategy has to be locked in well before the Joint Claim Construction and Prehearing Statement, because the briefing schedule after that document is tight and unforgiving.
Strategic Considerations: Patent Owner vs. Accused Infringer
The same claim term often looks different from the two sides of the v. The patent owner usually wants a construction broad enough to cover the accused product but narrow enough to avoid invalidating prior art — the classic claim-construction tightrope. The accused infringer usually wants a construction narrow enough that the accused product falls outside the claim, or broad enough that the claim reads on prior art and falls to anticipation or obviousness.
Patent Owner Perspective
The patent owner constructs the term to cover the accused product without sweeping in invalidating prior art. Use the specification’s embodiments and figures to anchor a construction broad enough to capture the accused implementation but tied to the disclosed invention. Avoid statements during prosecution — including in IPR — that operate as disclaimer. Where the parties have a genuine dispute about claim scope, invoke O2 Micro to remind the court of its affirmative duty to resolve that dispute rather than to leave it for the jury under a bare “plain and ordinary meaning” label.
Accused-Infringer Perspective
Mine the prosecution history for clear-and-unmistakable disclaimers and the specification for narrow embodiments that limit scope. Where the intrinsic record is fatally ambiguous, brief indefiniteness under Nautilus as an alternative to a strained narrow construction. For software / electronics claims, scrutinize means-plus-function language under § 112(f) for missing corresponding structure.
Both Sides: Build the Record for Teva
Where extrinsic evidence (expert testimony) matters, build it into the record so that subsidiary fact-findings are explicit on the face of the claim-construction order. Under Teva, those findings are reviewed for clear error — appellate deference is available only if the district-court record contains the findings to defer to.
Term Selection Discipline
Brief only the terms that genuinely affect infringement or validity. Most judges impose term caps; even where they do not, briefing every term counsel could conceivably dispute dilutes the dispositive ones and signals to the court that the construction request is not load-bearing.
How Markman Rulings Drive Summary Judgment
A claim-construction ruling is procedural in form but frequently dispositive in effect. Once the court adopts a construction for each disputed term, the parties can evaluate the infringement case against the accused product with the claim meaning fixed. A narrower construction often means the accused product falls outside the claim, supporting a defendant’s motion for summary judgment of noninfringement. A broader construction often exposes the claim to invalidating prior art, supporting a defendant’s invalidity motion or an IPR challenge.
That is why claim construction is better treated as a strategic exercise rather than a purely procedural one. The proposed constructions filed in the joint statement are not neutral; they are designed to position the claim for a summary-judgment outcome once the court rules. A Markman hearing that appears to resolve only the meaning of six technical terms can, in practice, shape the outcome of the entire case.
What Happens at the Markman Hearing Itself?
The format of a Markman hearing varies by judge and district. Some judges hold lengthy live hearings with technology tutorials, live expert witnesses, and oral argument on each disputed term. Others conduct the claim-construction exercise primarily on the papers, holding a brief hearing for argument or no hearing at all. The assigned judge’s individual rules and scheduling order determine whether live testimony is permitted at the hearing itself.
Common components of a live Markman hearing include:
Technology Tutorial
A neutral explanation of the underlying technology — sometimes delivered live by counsel, sometimes as a pre-recorded video — to orient the judge before argument. Many districts encourage tutorials separately from contested argument.
Live Expert Testimony
Expert declarations are routinely submitted with the briefs. A subset of judges permit live expert testimony at the hearing so the record is clear under Teva’s clear-error standard if subsidiary fact findings are contested on appeal.
Attorney Argument
Counsel argue each disputed term, usually in a structured sequence matching the briefs. Judges frequently limit argument time per term and limit the number of terms briefed in the first place.
Written Claim-Construction Order
The judge issues a written order adopting a construction for each disputed term. The order may follow the hearing by weeks or months; summary judgment and trial scheduling typically wait on it.
The Stakes of Claim Construction
The doctrinal arc behind a Markman hearing runs from a unanimous Supreme Court allocation in Markman — claim construction belongs to the judge, not the jury — through the en banc Phillips hierarchy that ranks intrinsic evidence above extrinsic, to Teva’s split standard of appellate review that rewards a clean evidentiary record on subsidiary fact-findings. The strategic implication is consistent across every patent case: the proposed constructions filed in the joint statement are not neutral procedural placeholders. They are designed to position the claim for a summary-judgment outcome once the court rules — on infringement for the patent owner, on noninfringement or invalidity for the accused infringer. A Markman hearing that appears to resolve only the meaning of a handful of technical terms can, in practice, decide which side prevails on the merits.
Why Keyhani LLC for Markman Strategy
Keyhani LLC is an intellectual property litigation boutique with substantial federal IP litigation experience as lead counsel. The firm handles patent infringement cases from complaint through trial and appeal, including claim-construction briefing and Markman hearings in the District of New Jersey, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and other federal district courts.
Darius Keyhani is admitted to the bars of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court, and the Southern, Eastern, and Western Districts of New York, and holds an LL.M. from NYU School of Law. The firm handles both plaintiff and defense-side Markman work — including claim-construction strategy, expert selection and declaration drafting, joint claim-construction statements, opening and responsive Markman briefing, and hearing presentation — and approaches claim construction as the strategic exercise it is.
Frequently Asked Questions About Markman Hearings
What happens at a Markman hearing?
The district judge presides over an argument focused on the meaning of disputed patent claim terms. Counsel argue each term in turn, working from the claim language, the specification, and the prosecution history — the intrinsic record that Phillips places at the top of the hierarchy. Many judges begin with a technology tutorial, often delivered by counsel or by a neutral expert, to orient the court before contested argument. Whether live witness testimony is permitted varies by judge: some take expert testimony at the hearing so the record is clear under Teva’s clear-error standard, while others confine the hearing to attorney argument and rely on the declarations submitted with the briefs.
How long does a Markman hearing typically last?
Markman hearings vary widely in length depending on the number of disputed terms, the complexity of the technology, and the assigned judge’s practices. A focused hearing on a small number of terms may be completed in a few hours. Hearings in technically complex cases — particularly those that include a technology tutorial, live expert testimony, and extensive argument on a larger set of disputed terms — can extend across a full day or, less commonly, multiple days. Some judges resolve claim construction primarily on the papers and hold only a short argument session. The actual length is set by the assigned judge’s scheduling order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 rather than by any local patent rule.
What does Markman briefing typically cost in a federal patent case?
Costs vary by district, technology complexity, the number of disputed terms, and whether the parties retain testifying experts for claim construction. The principal cost drivers are claim-construction expert work (expert engagement, declarations, and possible deposition) and attorney time on the joint claim-construction statement, opening and responsive briefs, the technology tutorial, and the hearing itself. Because cost ranges vary widely with the facts of a particular case, prospective clients should discuss expected scope and budgeting directly with counsel rather than rely on generalized figures.
How does a Markman hearing interact with an IPR stay?
When a defendant files an IPR petition with the PTAB, district courts often consider whether to stay the district-court litigation pending the PTAB’s final written decision. The Federal Circuit’s VirtualAgility-line factors typically govern the analysis, including whether claim construction has issued, whether discovery is complete, and whether a stay would simplify issues. Courts are generally more willing to stay before claim construction than after it, because once a Markman ruling has issued the case is materially advanced. A patent owner (also called the patentee in older cases and statutes) facing a stay motion will frequently argue that the construction issued in the district-court Markman should govern, while the petitioner argues the PTAB’s broader construction standard for unexpired patents may yield different results.
What happens if a claim-construction issue surfaces mid-trial?
Under O2 Micro International Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Technology Co., 521 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2008), if the parties present a fundamental dispute about claim scope, it is the court’s duty to resolve it — and that duty extends to disputes that surface mid-trial. In practice, district judges may convene a brief in-trial conference to address the issue, issue a supplemental claim-construction order, give a curative jury instruction defining the term, or, in some cases, recall a witness to address the construction on the record. A construction first articulated mid-trial preserves the dispute for appellate review on the same standards that apply to a pretrial Markman ruling, but the timing creates obvious risks for both sides — which is why early identification of all disputed terms during the joint claim-construction process is part of disciplined Markman practice.
What should counsel avoid saying at the Markman hearing?
A Markman hearing is about claim construction, not infringement or invalidity, and arguments that confuse those issues tend to land badly. Counsel should not press infringement read-on arguments at the hearing — that comes later, after the construction is fixed. Counsel should not import limitations from the specification into the claims, a practice the Federal Circuit has repeatedly cautioned against. Counsel should avoid attacking the credentials of an opposing expert without a substantive basis tied to the Phillips hierarchy. And counsel should not ask the judge to rule on indefiniteness if the parties have not actually briefed indefiniteness as a discrete issue, because the Nautilus standard requires its own analysis even when the underlying intrinsic record overlaps with claim construction.
What stages does a patent case move through?
A patent case in federal district court typically moves through these stages: (1) the complaint and answer with any counterclaims and pleadings motions; (2) infringement and invalidity contentions exchanged under the local patent rules; (3) claim construction — the Markman process, often case-determinative; (4) fact discovery; (5) expert discovery, including reports and depositions; (6) summary judgment motions on infringement or invalidity; and (7) trial, with appeal to the Federal Circuit thereafter. Markman sits at stage three, and because the court’s constructions often shape both summary judgment and the universe of trial issues, the Markman process frequently functions as the inflection point of the entire litigation.
Discuss Your Patent Matter with Keyhani LLC
If you are evaluating Markman strategy for an active or anticipated patent matter, Keyhani LLC represents plaintiffs and defendants in patent infringement litigation in the District of New Jersey, the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York, and (through pro hac vice admission where appropriate) federal courts nationwide, with experience across diverse technology areas. To discuss a patent matter, schedule a case evaluation with our litigation team.